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Abstract
This article dives into the ongoing debate on how to address concerns of personal safety and respect online, as well as con-
sequences for exposure to polarizing and in various ways harmful information, while at the same time safeguarding the
democratic essentials of freedom of expression and participation. It does so by examining the issue from a less common
angle, namely who governs the Internet and the platforms where much of the toxic material appears. By applying a model
of free speech regulation conceptualized by legal scholar Jack Balkin (2018a, 2018b), the article explores different theoret-
ical future scenarios of Internet governance involving three main players, namely governments, private companies, and
speakers. The analysis finds that depending on which player is at the forefront, the outcomes from the standpoint of par-
ticipation and freedom of speech may be drastically different. While there is potential for transformation that can enable
more ownership, transparency, and agency for citizens and news media, some potential paths will place ever-increasing
control over the interests of users.
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1. Introduction
For those who remember the dawn of the modern
Internet, the sense of unlimited possibilities may be rem-
iniscent. Not only did we gain access to information in a
completely different way at the touch of amouse button,
but could connect with people in previously unthinkable
ways. With the Internet decentralizing communication,
putting new forms of speech and cultural expressions
into the hands of participants, a radical enhancement of
democracy was seen as a possibility (Poster, 1997). Over
time, the Internet via socialmedia platforms indeed grew
into an important new tool in citizen struggles for free-
dom and democracy (Chadwick & Howard, 2009), such
as during the Arab Spring in 2011 (Allagui, 2014).
Our modern Internet however also features aspects
that fit poorly with the idea of participation in a further-
ance of democracy on equal grounds. There is consider-
able research on the prevalence of harmful, polarizing
content online (e.g., Assimakopoulos, Baider, & Millar,
2017; Harmer & Lumdsen, 2019; Keipi, Näsi, Oksanen,
& Räsänen, 2017), content which may have an effect
on how targeted groups participate online, potentially
silencing them altogether (van der Wilk, 2018). Online
arenas where users can remain anonymous have been
particularly highlighted, as they can provide breeding
ground for extreme forms of online communication and
sharing of very offensive information (Blumler, 2015).
Calls for regulation or even removal of such content
online are frequent. The question is, how? Governments
are not able to surveil all online communication and
instantly block or remove harmful content (DeNardis,
2020). Moderation of content is not an easy task, in-
volving a number of complex decisions and interpreta-
tions regarding, for example, original intent of the con-
tent, how it fits within the boundaries of current cul-
tural taste, and public discourse in a situation wheremul-
tiple competing value systems exist at the same time
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(Gillespie, 2018). In other words, rules for what is accept-
able speech and how to establish rules that can meet
the needs of very large and diverse groups of users is
not only difficult, but inevitably political (Suzor, 2020).
However, the platforms are not democratically elected
public entities. Nevertheless, governments can delegate
the task of regulation to such private entities (Arpagian,
2016; Coche, 2018; DeNardis, 2020). There may be mul-
tiple reasons for such public-private collaborations, in-
cluding aspects of national security, where actions taken
after the 9/11 terror attacks in the U.S. constitute an
early example (Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, 2003). This de-
velopment arguably reached new heights in connec-
tion with the Covid-19 pandemic and the World Health
Organization’s declaration of an on-going “infodemic”
(World Health Organization, 2020). Multiple platforms,
following thewishes of governments, during this time be-
gan to actively censor harmful information relating to the
virus (Goldsmith & Woods, 2020). The most dominating
method is however a form of ‘self-regulation,’ whereby
social platforms by virtue of not being liable for its con-
tent exist in a fairly laissez-faire relationship with gov-
ernments (Gorwa, 2019b; Klonick, 2018). Still, platforms
like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube in various ways regu-
late content today (Gorwa, 2019b; Kaye, 2019; Ullman
& Tomalin, 2019), and this type of intervention of se-
lection and deletion of content occurs constantly, even
though most users never come in direct contact with it
(Gillespie, 2015).
This expanding aspect of control over content how-
ever actualizes the idea of unintended consequences.
In the worst-case scenario, the incredibly powerful tech-
nologies that have enabled us freedom are the very
same that authoritarian regimes can obtain control over
and use for repression (DeNardis, 2014, 2020; York &
Zuckerman, 2019). Alternatively, if the private companies
that already function as gatekeepers for online content
as exemplified above increasingly take ownership of fun-
damental aspects of the Internet’s infrastructures, it in
turn raises questions regarding transparency and concen-
tration of power by entities not elected by democratic
means (Nothias, 2020). Control of the underlying infras-
tructure that enables online content, generated by every-
one from individual users to journalists to public agen-
cies as part of democratic discourse, can thus have far-
reaching effects on the ability to speak freely.
This article departs from a perspective that once fo-
cus expands from content to who has the power to reg-
ulate it, a defining feature of the digital age appears:
the friction present between freedom of speech and in-
frastructure (Balkin, 2014). It also applies an understand-
ing that significant technological advancements in the
near future can tip the current development towards
a version involving private enterprise domination in co-
operation with governments, or one where information
is seen as an essential service and is governed by rep-
resentative institutions, or possibly directly by citizens
(Mosco, 2016). Considering how it remains very unclear
as to what the preferable balance in terms of responsi-
bility should be between tech companies, governments,
and users in a policy arena that has aptly been labelled
as “fragmented” (Gorwa, 2019b, p. 855), emphasis is
here on possibilities, not making determinations. This ar-
ticle thus aims to explore these trajectories, with focus
upon consequences for accessibility and freedom of ex-
pression. It does so by discussing contemporary devel-
opments specific to each of the three main players in-
volved, meaning governments, private companies, and
users, seen through the lens of legal scholar Jack Balkin’s
model of free speech as a triangle (Balkin, 2018a, 2018b).
Depending on which player takes the lead in governing
the Internet, I argue that outcomes for a free and fair
Internet may diverge drastically.
2. Internet Governance and Freedom of Speech
A perspective based on who governs the Internet falls
under the broad concept of ‘Internet governance,’ an
understudied area of research (DeNardis, 2020) that in-
volves the “design and administration of the technical in-
frastructure necessary to keep the Internet operational
and the enactment of substantive policies around these
technologies” (DeNardis, 2014, p. 6). The technical ar-
chitecture involves a number of protocols, standards,
and systems, vital yet hardly discernable to the average
Internet user, reflective of a number of not only scien-
tific advancements but “social considerations of power
and authority” (DeNardis, 2014, p. 8). This article fo-
cuses less on the technical aspects but instead on one
specific theme within the area of Internet governance,
namely how it functions as a proxy for content con-
trol (DeNardis, 2014). Importantly, the concept of ‘gov-
ernance’ comprises both that of governments and pri-
vate intermediaries.
Scholarly discussions regarding aspects of Internet
infrastructure, privacy, and speech regulation appeared
among legal scholars during the dramatic growth of the
public Internet in the 1990s. Among those raising warn-
ing flags were Lawrence Lessig (1998, p. 3), who claimed
that cyberspace “has the potential to be the antithe-
sis of a space of freedom.” While not everyone agreed
(Sunstein, 1995), Lessig (2000) introduced the concept
of ‘code is law,’ which not only highlighted the underlying
politics of the decisions made regarding infrastructure of
the Internet and the potential for governmental restric-
tions on free speech via new technology, but also that
there were other interests involved, namely private.
Jack Balkin similarly at an early stage identified po-
tential issues regarding freedom of expression and the
infrastructure of the Internet. In 2004, he argued that the
preservation of freedom of speech would be dependent
on the design of the technological infrastructure, and
that in fact, the digital agewould alter the entiremeaning
of freedom of expression (Balkin, 2004). A decade later,
Balkin (2014) claimed that the infrastructure of the on-
line platforms had over time begun to merge with the
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infrastructure of speech regulation as well as with that
of public and private surveillance, altering participation
in the new public sphere altogether.
3. Free Speech in the Digital World
The analytical framework used in this article relies on
Balkin’s above notion on participation in the contempo-
rary digital world, and applies his model of free speech
as a triangle per Figure 1 below (Balkin, 2018a, 2018b).
In essence, the model builds upon an idea of a previous
dualist model of free speech having developed into a plu-
ralist. Dualist in the sense that before the advent of the
Internet, there were two main players, namely govern-
ments, or nation-states, and speakers. The former reg-
ulated all types of speakers, which included everything
from citizens to mass media. Discussions on the concept
of free expression, as well as possible dangers to free
expression, that were held during the 1800s and 1900s,
typically centered upon if nation-states would censor
its citizens (Balkin, 2018b). The pluralist model in con-
trast involves multiple players, but at least three primary
ones: nation-states and supra-national entities such as
the European Union, private enterprises that maintain
the digital infrastructure, particularly search engines and
social media platforms, and finally speakers who in differ-
ent ways use digital infrastructure in order to communi-
cate. The addition of the third player, private enterprises,
has over time made the dualist model less applicable,
meaning that the ability for free expression in the cur-
rent time period is affected by power struggles between
these three main players (Balkin, 2018b).
Fundamentally, Balkin (2018a, 2018b) sees three
main problems with the formation of the triangle: the
risk of censorship, lack of due process and transparency,
and digital surveillance. The development of these prob-
lems can be illustrated by using one type of potentially
harmful online content, namely false stories portrayed as
news circulating online, commonly known as ‘fake news,’
a term actualized particularly after the 2016U.S. election
(Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017).
Concerns over fake content can be raised from all
three corners of the triangle, yet when it comes to tack-
ling it, the range of agency varies greatly. If the con-
tent does not explicitly violate the law, government ac-
tors in democratic nations do not typically seek out and
reprimand or restrict individuals who are either produc-
ing and/or sharing it at a systematic level. Anonymity
also complicates efforts. Neither do private citizens di-
rectly block the ability of others to partake in such be-
havior on social media platforms; complaints and report-
ing disturbing content are the primarymeasures. Instead,
agency lies with the owners of the digital infrastructure,
meaning the tech companies. In the case of a social
media platform, violations against community standards
can be cause for content being removed, or users be-
ing restricted. There are many reasons why a platform
would make such a decisions, including generally want-
ing users to feel happy and safe, and remain on the
platform. Motivated by profit, private companies will in-
deed inevitably delimit and restrain participation in some
way (Andersson Schwarz, 2017). Another reason is to
appease one of the other players, namely governments
(Balkin, 2018a).
While governments may not immediately threaten
a social media platform for allowing fake news, govern-
ments can persuade and in other ways cajole a com-
pany into regulating speech. Even in a situation where
the tech company applies a very high bar for regulating
content, if profit is more stable by cooperating with gov-
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Figure 1. Balkin’s (2018b) pluralist model of speech regulation.
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ernments, measures might be taken to block users or re-
move content (Balkin, 2018b). The bigger the company,
the more capabilities it may have to regulate speech,
and thus a back-and-forth cooperation/co-optation be-
tween the two players develops which Balkin (2018a,
p. 1153) calls “new-school speech regulation.” It can be
contrasted with its “old-school” version, meaning regula-
tion that is primarily directed toward speakers by govern-
ments, still an active feature today (Balkin, 2018b).
New-school speech regulation under the above cir-
cumstances leads to the three main issues identified by
Balkin (2018a, 2018b). First of all, if told to censor or
block by government, companies will tend to err on the
side of caution. This can lead to overblocking or over-
filtering of content, or even censorship, with tech com-
panies incentivized more by avoiding discussions with
government regarding liability concerns for content on
their platform than restricting a very limited number of
users (Balkin, 2018a, 2018b). The use of algorithms to
moderate content has also been found to result in un-
fair censorship, when far too much content is removed
(Kaye, 2019).
Secondly, the process of blocking or removal,
whether done before or after content such as fake news
materializes online, is not the result of trying the matter
in a judicial process, during which for example, a de-
termination is made regarding whether the expressed
speech was protected or unprotected by law. This par-
ticular aspect is instead one where the private company
has tremendous power, governing in what can be de-
scribed as a “lawless” way (Suzor, 2020, p. 6). Thus,
while the platforms might act upon pressure from demo-
cratically elected governments, they have in this system
developed a form of privatized government, void of ac-
countability towards users. In essence, platforms can be
dubbed our ‘New Governors’ (Klonick, 2018).
Finally, in order to locate and track users who for
example produce and/or share fake news, tech compa-
nies benefit from knowing as much as possible about
them. Such capability has since long been expanding,
based upon the need to be able to convince advertis-
ers of maximum exposure to possible customers. The
more an operators’ infrastructure expands, the greater
the capability to collect user data will be, and in turn,
the greater role such companies can play in new-school
speech regulation. However, on the other side of this
development is increased user vulnerability to digital
surveillance, the thirdmain issue raised by Balkin (2018a,
2018b). Considering howmonetization of consumer data
has become the primary source of revenue for tech gi-
ants such as Google and Facebook (DeNardis, 2020), as
part of a business model Zuboff (2019) calls ‘surveillance
capitalism,’ this is arguably an ongoing process of increas-
ing magnitude.
While there are multiple ways of conceptualizing the
central aspect of free expression, the argument from
a democratic standpoint in its most basic form stems
from the idea that freedom of political debate and thus
the flow of information and ideas must be protected
in order for voters to reach a high level of knowledge
(Oster, 2017). At face value, the three interlinked prob-
lems above seem like ingredients for the antithesis of a
transparent, democratic system with equal access and
freedom of speech. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the
introduction, the current infrastructural set-up seems to
be in motion (Mosco, 2016). In order to explore what
such a future development may look like, in the next sec-
tion the triangular model above is applied from the per-
spective of letting one player in the triangle each take the
lead with basis in current developments. Three possible
scenarios appear, labelled by their primary characteris-
tic: government regulation, privatized ‘walled gardens,’
and decentralization. Each scenario is discussed below,
with emphasis on consequences for the issues of the risk
of censorship, lack of due process and transparency, and
digital surveillance.
4. Three Scenarios
4.1. Scenario 1: Government Regulation
A situation where government takes the lead in the con-
text of speech regulation may seem superfluous, as gov-
ernments and other public entities already form a natu-
ral and essential player in our current system. However,
when it comes to new-school speech regulation, actions
by government can be pushed very far. In the contem-
porary situation, China serves as the clearest example
(Romano, 2010), with grave consequences for censor-
ship, transparency, and surveillance.
According to Moore (2018, p. 237), about a decade
ago, the Chinese government saw the opportunity to,
with the aid of tech companies, ‘tame’ the Internet and
thereby establish more centralized control over society
than ever before seen, resulting in “an arsenal thatwould
make any twentieth century totalitarian state extremely
jealous.” This ‘taming’ has multiple features. Most no-
tably there is the Chinese government’s Golden Shield
Project put into operation already in 2003, a very com-
prehensive domestic surveillance system often referred
to as ‘the Great Firewall,’ which enables comprehen-
sive censoring of unwanted Internet content (Merrill,
2016, p. 90; Moore, 2018). The Chinese government
has since expanded its ability to control information by
establishing the country’s national social credit score
system, in which speech is one of the factors that de-
termines a citizen’s “trustworthiness” (DeNardis, 2020).
Importantly, the Chinese government is able to accom-
plish this unprecedented level of centralization thanks to
co-operation by tech companies, both Chinese and for-
eign (Moore, 2018; Romano, 2010).
Yet China is not the only empirical indicator of the
possible scenario for how far a development toward in-
creased government control and regulation can proceed.
The most extreme method of controlling the Internet is
to simply shut it down, colloquially known as having ac-
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cess to an “Internet kill switch” (Vargas-Leon, 2016). The
shut-downs in a number of countries during the Arab
Spring illustrate the reality of this development, yet is ap-
plicable not only by distinctly authoritarian governments.
For example, in 2019, Russia adopted a law that allows
the government to cut off the Internet entirely (Kennedy,
2019). Furthermore, among the ten governments that
attempted to flip the switch between 2009 and 2014,
the well-consolidated democracy Australia was among
them. The idea of providing government the power to
shut down the Internet legally has also been discussed in
both the U.K. and the U.S. (Vargas-Leon, 2016). In other
words, the norm of censoring the Internet extends glob-
ally (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2010).
While theremay bemultiple reasons as towhy demo-
cratic governments establish tools to, if not shut down
the Internet, at least have the ability to regulate, surveil,
and censor it, the balancing act of still maintaining a
free Internet might prove difficult. Independent watch-
dog organization Freedom House concluded in their lat-
est report that Internet freedom declined for the ninth
consecutive year globally (Shahbaz & Funk, 2019). The
organization particularly highlighted social media, point-
ing to platforms being surveilled by repressive govern-
ments. Yet also in democracies, mass monitoring is be-
coming more common across government agencies. For
example, the U.K. is noted for its government’s increas-
ing interest in regulating platforms and content online,
monitoring of activists from various political groups us-
ing data obtained from platforms as well as a novel form
of Internet access restriction employed when Wi-Fi con-
nections in some of London’s Underground train stations
were suspended by the police during protests (Shahbaz
& Funk, 2019). Such findings seem to follow the logic
of research found almost a decade prior regarding the
U.K.’s vast surveillance measures and, at that point, lim-
ited yet burgeoning filtering of online content (Deibert
et al., 2010). In Germany, a uniquely strict and heav-
ily criticized law that required social media platforms to
swiftly remove hate speech or face hefty fines has since
adoption in 2017 been found to lead to excessive block-
ing of content (Thomasson, 2018). The law was enacted
due to an apparent frustration with some of the ma-
jor U.S. social media platforms when it came to remov-
ing content considered to be unlawful (Gorwa, 2019b).
Thus, even at relatively milder forms, with democratic
governments at the helm of actively intervening and try-
ing to remove deeply disturbing or unwanted content
under what can be labelled as “external governance”
(Gorwa, 2019b, p. 863), there is a risk of censorship,
lack of due process through public-private cooperation,
and surveillance.
4.2. Scenario 2: Privatized ‘Walled Gardens’
Tech companies already play an essential role in new-
school speech regulation in tandem with public enti-
ties, yet in a scenario where they are empowered, such
ties could alter. Instead of moderating speech in various
forms based upon governmental regulations, expanding
the scope of the control that can be exercised over access
in the first place constitutes another path.
One model for such expansion is a zero-rating ser-
vice, providing Internet access for free but under cer-
tain conditions, such as limits on which sites can be vis-
ited. The concept has been around since the early 2010s,
with a number of projects having been launched such as
Google FreeZone, Wikipedia Zero, and perhaps most fa-
mously, Facebook’s Free Basics initiative (Bates, Bavitz, &
Hessekiel, 2017). Proponents argue that zero rating may
be the first step toward expanding access in underserved
markets. Critics point to how much control over content
the model enables, as well as violations of net neutral-
ity principles by not treating all Internet traffic equally
(Bates et al., 2017), in essence providing a ‘walled garden’
version of the Internet (DeNardis, 2020). For instance,
Free Basics in India did not allowusers tomake voice calls
and reserved Facebook the right to limit access to other
services (Culpepper & Thelen, 2020). After much public
debate, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India also
ruled that Free Basics violated the country’s net neutral-
ity and thereby effectively banned all zero-ratings plans
(Prasad, 2018). Facebook has nevertheless pursued the
project elsewhere and it is currently available in 65 coun-
tries of which about half are in Africa (Nothias, 2020).
The idea of awalled garden service in a tech-oriented
future scenario can however take on othermore compre-
hensive infrastructural forms. In 2019, Amazon filed for
U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) permis-
sion to launch Project Kuiper, which if successful enables
the company to become an Internet Service Provider by
providing satellite broadband. Other competing compa-
nies such as SpaceX, WebOne, and Facebook have also
joined in the quest to establish space-based Internet ser-
vices. Arguments by proponents resemble those of zero
rating-services, i.e., Internet access being provided to the
worlds’ many underserved consumers (Kuiper Systems
LLC, 2019; Pressman, 2019).
Providing low-cost Internet service to potentially bil-
lions of usersworldwide arguably constitutes an example
of how private enterprise can open up the field, increas-
ing accessibility and encouraging competition. While
companies such as Amazon and Facebook did express
criticism over the FCC’s decision in 2017 to roll back net
neutrality rules (Wattles, 2017), it is nevertheless a possi-
bility that either one of the competing companies end up
offering a very affordable service, yet with various types
of restrictions. In fact, a walled garden approach could
be a logical development of a continuous extension of
the scope of privatized governance already established,
with fuel being provided by a constant flow of highly valu-
able social data.
Finally, developments in institutionalization of con-
tent control among platforms provide an additional il-
lustration of where an empowered private triangle cor-
ner could be heading. Claiming the company should
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not “make so many important decisions about free ex-
pression and safety on our own” (Zuckerberg, 2018),
Facebook in May 2020 announced an independent
Oversight Board to perform this task (Clegg, 2020), a
move argued to represent nothing short of a “pivotal
moment in the history of online speech governance”
(Douek, 2019, p. 4). In the same month, Amazon’s live-
streaming platformTwitch announced its Safety Advisory
Council, whose purpose is to shape the platform’s poli-
cies on bans, for example, after accusations of un-
founded bans of streamers (Greenspan, 2020). No plat-
form board or council will however be able to provide
due process in the handling of all content violation re-
ports filed on a daily basis, nor appease all critics of cen-
sorship. Instead, and especially in combination with a
walled garden Internet service, the level of control over
allowed speech at a global scale can potentially increase
multifold if tech companies take the lead.
4.3. Scenario 3: Decentralization
The third scenario involves the corner of the trian-
gle subject to speech regulation from both other cor-
ners, namely actual speakers using digital infrastructure
to communicate or access information. While speakers
have the ability to exit platforms or services, or in vari-
ous other ways protest or put pressure on tech compa-
nies to modify their policies (Balkin, 2018a), in the plu-
ralist model of speech regulation, speakers take on the
role of underdog. Indeed, the three main issues of cen-
sorship, lack of due process, and digital surveillance all
have a direct effect on them.
A theoretical scenario where speakers are put at the
helm of the development of the digital world would
mean a renegotiation of the drastically unequal power
relationship with the two other corners of the triangle.
In the mid-1990s, cyber activist John Perry Barlow (1996,
para. 8) argued for a radically free Internet existing be-
yond the grip of traditional governing institutions “where
anyone, anywheremay express his or her beliefs, nomat-
ter how singular, without fear of being coerced into si-
lence or conformity.” Such ideas have since been dis-
missed as absurd and utopian (Morrison, 2009). Yet as-
pects of pre-commercial Internet, when individual com-
puters connected with each other in a network with-
out a centralized transit point (Musiani, 2015), are still
highly relevant under the concept of the ‘Decentralized
Web’ (DW).
In its very simplest form, a decentralized network re-
moves the need for a central server and allows for multi-
ple servers (or ‘nodes’) to cooperate, in essence all sup-
plying capacity in terms of storage and computing power
(Kremenova & Gajdos, 2019). Multiple examples of DW
platforms, applications, and services using peer-to-peer
decentralized protocols have so far been established; cur-
rent examples include the open source microblogging
service Mastodon, the social network Diaspora, and the
video-sharing platform PeerTube. At the core of this new
technology is that communicating via a DW platform
means social data is no longer centralized and owned
by a tech company, meaning that mining data on users
becomes more difficult (Raman, Joglekar, De Cristofaro,
Sastry, & Tyson, 2019). As the fundamentals of new-
school speech regulation transform when users can be
in charge of their own data, issues of digital surveillance
and ultimately blocking of users in a process void of due
process are no longer the same.
However, peer-to-peer digital tools such as block-
chain technology may also alter another aspect of the
speaker in Balkin’s triangle beyond the individual user,
namely newsmedia and journalists.While still verymuch
under development, the technology can allow journal-
ism to be less dependent on an intermediary, meaning
actors with direct or indirect interests on the information
and news being produced, such as large media corpora-
tions, private enterprises, and even politicians. Reducing
the distance between journalist and reader by removing
centralized control mechanism in both the creation and
management of news content can potentially enhance
news credibility and transparency, and even limit the
spread of unwanted content such as fake news (Al-Saqaf
& Edwardsson, 2019).
Finally, relating to the theme of speakers gaining
more control is the idea of transforming the entire con-
cept of what the Internet is and who should govern
it. As technology advances and human dependence on
the Internet increases, the argument is that the Internet
should be treated not as a commercial product but as
a public utility, controlled by citizens (Mosco, 2016).
The concept was, for example, echoed in the 2016 U.K.
Labour Party’s campaign for free broadband through a
new public company (Corbyn, 2016), but various more
local versions of publicly owned Internet providers have
been in place for years. Most notably, there is the U.S.
city of Chattanooga, Tennessee, where affordable high-
speed broadband has been offered by a city-owned util-
ity since 2010 (Flessner, 2020). Additionally, local ini-
tiatives can help underserved non-metropolitan areas,
such as in the U.S., where cooperatives provide almost
a third of all Internet fiber service in rural areas, re-
sembling how cooperatives in the country have histori-
cally been able to provide both electric-and telephone
services rurally (Trostle, Kienbaum, Andrews, & Mitchell,
2019). The potential for enhancing democracy via decen-
tralized models and a different type of ownership model
of the Internet itself is thus apparent, while currently ex-
isting only in minor scale.
4.4. Discussion
While Balkin’s model of free speech as a triangle allows
for an examination of the relationships between the
main players involved, highlighting that we have moved
far from a predominantly dualist system, the gains made
from simplifying a highly complex situation create a
deficit when it comes to nuance. To begin with, it means
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that relationships within the corners themselves are not
fully illuminated. An example is the placing of ‘legacy
media’ in the same corner as everyday users, an issue
which can be illustrated using an on-going development.
Amazon contracts with the U.S. government, particularly
when it comes to web storage; the U.S. government has
been projected to become Amazon’s biggest customer
(DePillis, 2018). In 2013, Amazon’s founder Jeff Bezos pur-
chased legacy newspaper The Washington Post, quickly
raising concerns regarding potential conflicts of interest
and the ability for the newspaper to maintain unbiased
news reporting, especially when it came to the U.S. gov-
ernment (Hart, 2013). In short, the effect of new school
speech regulation on citizens is thus difficult to concep-
tualize as being equal to that of legacy media.
Secondly, the sharp corners of the triangle obscure
potential merging points. By merging points, I mean an
altering of the relationship primarily speakers have to ei-
ther one of the two other corners. For instance, and as
alluded to in the third scenario, the relationship between
governments and its citizens can feature a wholly differ-
ent level of transparency and accessibility, as proposed
by Mosco (2016). It is for example possible for govern-
ment to, via a decentralized system, provide extensive
access to personal data, such in the case of Estonia, a pi-
oneer in terms of e-government and in the very top in
terms of Internet freedom (Shahbaz & Funk, 2019). The
approach of a highly advanced e-government, where the
citizen is more of an active partner than a passive con-
sumer of services (Linders, 2012; Linders, Liao, & Wang,
2018), can also enable new forms of cooperation and par-
ticipation affecting actual policies not only between gov-
ernment and citizens, but also incorporating tech com-
panies. Taiwan’s participatory digital democracy and the
ideas of its Digital Minister Audrey Tang (see, e.g., Tang,
2019a, 2019b, 2020) serve as an example here and ap-
ply not only to how public services are conceived, con-
structed, and delivered by involving multiple stakehold-
ers, but to how the issue of harmful content online can
be approached. For example, during the Covid-19 pan-
demic, Taiwan’s strategy to counter disinformation on-
line was called “humor over rumor,” a strategy which
involved government swiftly communicating factually-
based humorous ‘packages’ that in essence disrobed the
false information instead of removing it, which was not
seen as an option (Tang, 2020). In order to combat infor-
mation with intent to cause harm, the strategy again did
not involve takedowns of posts on social media. Instead,
the government collaborated with both journalists and
social media companies to ensure that a small reminder
text was added to for example an image being used to
promote a false narrative, enabling users to quickly iden-
tify actual versus false news material (Tang, 2020).
The second theoretically possible merging point in
the triangle is between speakers and private enter-
prises. Considering the problematization of Internet
governance and regulation being in private hands in
the second scenario above, this may seem far-fetched.
Nevertheless, by conceptualizing privately owned on-
line platforms as operating civic functions, a meeting
point at least arguably appears between the two corners.
As Are (2020) argues, privately owned online platforms
today function as public spaces, integrated in our every-
day lives and as sites for public discourse, and therefore
the norms, rules, and laws, including international hu-
man rights law,which apply to off-line businesses, should
apply also to them. Are (2020) defines social media plat-
forms as “corpo-civic” to capture the hybridity of the
space, where users can be seen as quasi-citizens and,
following such a status, be empowered to partake in
more fair, transparent, and diverse moderation of on-
line content than current methods headed by the tech
companies (Kaye, 2019). The model also involves the
third corner of the triangle, government, seeing its func-
tion to among other things uphold the rights of users
andmaintain oversight of the platforms (Are, 2020; Kaye,
2019), thereby offering further possible meeting points
between the three corners. In an alternate version, a
form of ‘co-governance’ of the online space could also
develop if civil rights organizations, part of the same cor-
ner as users, could be involved in setting up ethical frame-
works and oversight for privately owned online platforms
(Gorwa, 2019a, 2019b).
5. Conclusions
Based upon the idea of not overlooking the aspect of con-
trol over content when it comes our ability to partake in
a future social Internet, with all its conflicting features of
incredible freedom to engage in democratic discourse on
the one hand, and restrictions, bans, and surveillance on
the other, this article has explored three possible scenar-
ios for Internet governance. I find that more of the same,
when it comes to either one of the first two scenarios
where governments and private enterprise respectively
are at the forefront of developments, will, from the per-
spective of Balkin’s (2018a, 2018b) new-school speech
regulation, have potentially dire consequences for par-
ticipation and accessibility. Managing content in all its
forms, particularly on social media platforms, will be dif-
ficult without users and journalists being subjected to
various forms of continuously expanding regulations and
restrictions. While actions may be well intended, the in-
herent logic in needing to knowmore about speakers, in-
cluding news media, in order to prevent certain content
from appearing, coupled with ownership of the entire
service to begin with, will unlikely increase transparency
and accountability. A systematic sense of due process
is moreover likely impossible, as control needs to be
maintained over billions of users and their subsequent
actions online. The introduction of automated content
moderation may seem like a solution and a way for plat-
forms to take more responsibility, but research shows
that such methods may exacerbate the problems of lack
of transparency already in existence today (Gorwa, Binns,
& Katzenbach, 2020).
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Regarding the third scenario, where more control
is in various ways transferred to the speakers, the
prospects arguably look far brighter when it comes
to the freedom of expression and participation, ulti-
mately strengthening transparency and accountability.
However, such a model actualizes the issue of harmful
content yet again, content that in various ways threatens
individuals or groups, toxifies, and polarizes communi-
cation, potentially hindering participation and voices be-
ing heard. A decentralized system does not immediately
‘solve’ the proliferation of such content. What it may en-
able is for users themselves to engage more in modera-
tion on platforms and communities they wish to join on-
line, as well as more independence for news media.
The idea of treating the Internet as a public utility,
as also discussed in the third scenario, nevertheless il-
lustrates the potential of substantial change occurring in
the relationship between speakers and governments in
the future. If citizens and governments join efforts in the
management of information by representative institu-
tions at local all the way up to global level, the establish-
ment of rules and regulations for participation and free-
dom of speech can becomemore anchored in the demo-
cratic process, instead of drifting away from it. Different
types of hybridmodels are also possible, such as in the ex-
ample of very advanced forms of e-government increas-
ing and facilitating transparency and possibilities for co-
operation between citizens and government, as well as
tech companies.
Lastly, two significant developments during the first
half of 2020 provide avenues for future research. First of
all, the Covid-19 pandemic and its consequences for citi-
zensworldwidewill be a topic for research formany years
to come. The pandemic can, in the context of Internet
governance, be examined not only regarding the spread
of disinformation and how it was handled by different
countries and platforms in a time of crisis—examining
potential changes in the power struggles between the
three corners of Balkin’s triangle—but it can also be stud-
ied in regards of the importance of accessibility and par-
ticipation, as the Internet’s function as a crucial site of
public discourse, information, and everyday existence
expanded as many citizens spent extensive time in the
home. The second relevant development stems from the
wave of protests against police violence and racial in-
justice following the killing of George Floyd in May in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. Social media giants faced signif-
icant criticism for being sites of hateful content, in the
case of Facebook followed also by numerous advertis-
ing boycotts by major international brands. In response,
some of them took steps to ban and block users and con-
tent, such as when video streaming platform Twitch tem-
porarily suspended U.S. President Donald Trump’s chan-
nel, and social media site Reddit banned a pro-Trump
forum (Allyn, 2020). Building upon the momentum of a
movement of engaged groups, methods of involving civil
society in content moderation can be examined, as also
suggested by Gorwa (2019a) and Suzor (2020).
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